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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 8279

RUSSELL E. RICHARDS,
Defendant a;nd .Ap,pellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of April 17, 1954, at approximately
9 :00 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. Pierre Giraud were visiting Mr.
and Mrs. DeMar Hansen. Mrs. Giraud went outside the
house and heard the sheep milling around in her husband's corral nearby. She told her hushand and Mr.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Hansen that s·omeone or som·ething was in the corral and
suggested that they investigate. Mr. Hansen and Mr.
Giraud did so. Upon examining the corral, they found
the sheep to be at one end of

th~e

corral bunched together

as though th.ey were frightened. As they p-roceeded
through the corral, they noticed that at the far end of the
corral, separated from the other she·ep, was one sheep
lying on the ground. The two men walked to the other
end of the corral and at that point Mr. Giraud saw the
defendant lying prostrate on the ground ·and holding
the sheep by one of the hind legs (R. 24). The ·defendant
then

rel~eased

the leg of the she.ep and the sh:eep got up

and ran to the other sheep in the corral (R. 25). There
were drag marks some 20 to 23 feet in length, ending
at the place where the shHep lay, and ·extending in an
"L" shape toward the center of the corral (R. 16). Mr.
Hansen, Mr. Giraud and police officers, Bob Williams
and Ross G. Fran·dsen, all testified that they examined
these ·drag marks in the corral (R. 14, 23, 39, 48, 50, 53,
54, 58).
The defendant was charge'd with attempt to commit
grand larceny. The jury, after hearing the evidence,
~brought

in a verdict ·of guilty.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·RT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY AND THE STATE PRESENTED
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW INTENT OF APPELLANT
TO COMMIT GRAND LARCENY.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE· WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·RT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY AND THE STATE PRESENTED
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW INTENT OF APPELLANT
TO COMMIT GRAND LARCENY.

Se-ction 76-1-20, U.C.A. 1953, pr•ovides:
''In every crime or public offense there must
exist a union or joint operation of act and intent,
or criminal negligence. ''
Intent is an essential element of a crime or public
offense in the State of Utah. State v. Monson, 210 N.W.
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108, 109, 168 Minn. 381, defines intent as follows :
"Intent in larceny means doing an unlawful
act intentionally, that is freely, purposely."
Section 76-1-21, U.C.A. 1953, informs as to th-e method
by which intent may be determined:
"The intent or intention is manifested by the
circumstances connected with the offense and the
sound mind and discretion of the accused. * * • ''
The implication i~s that intent is to be determined by
the acts of the ·defendant and other circumstances involved in the evidence. State v. DuBois, 64 Utah 433, 231
P. 625, holds that the elem~ent of intent must be established by the circumstances of the taking or other proof.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Loper v.
U.S., 160 F-ed. 2d 293 (1947), held:
"The second contention is that the evidence
is insufficient to justify the verdict. Appellant
contends that he in good faith believed that the
calves were his own and that there was- no intent
to steal them and that th·ere was no intent to steal
them shown by the evid~nce. It is true that under
the law of Utah (U.C.A. 103-36-1) intent is a
necessary element of the crime of larceny, and
felonious intent to steal the calves was: a fact
which was necessary to establish by the evidence,
since we must look to the law of the place where
the property was taken in order to determine
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whether it was 'stolen' within the meaning of the

act. ·
There was ample evidence to sustain the ver. diet. Intent is not always disclosed 'by what one
says, but is determined by what one says and does
or fails to say and do in a given situation, together
with other facts and circumstances surrounding
the transaction.''
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict ·on the gr·ounds that the State
had not sufficiently proven the intent of the appellant.
The jury, after hearing the evidence, wer~e instructed
by the Honorable John L. Sevy, Judge of the Seventh
Judicial District Court, County of Carbon, as follows:
''INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"You are instructed that before you can find
the defendant guilty as charged in the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt the following:

***
''4. That the defendant Russell E. Richards
at said time and place att~empted the commission
of said larceny with the intent to permanently deprive the said Pierre Giraud of the ownership of
said sh~eep.
''It is not enough that one or more of these
elements be proved to your satisfaction beyond a
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6
reasonable doubt, but all of said elements must be
prcved from the evidenee in the cas·e. ''
(R. 10)

.

Thus the jury was charged that unless they found that
I

the attempt included the intent to steal, they were to find
the def·endant not guilty.
Instruction Nn. 10, made to the jury, states as follows:
''In every crime or public offens·e, there must
exist a union or joint ope-ration of act and intent.
The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances conniected with the offense, and the
sound mind and discretion of the accused.
''Every sane man is presumed to intend the
natural and prohaJble consequences of an act which
he intentionally performs. In other words, every
person is presumed to intend t:Q.at which his acts
indicate his intentions to have been."
( (R.15)

The cases support respondent's eontention that intent
is to be determined by the acts of the accus·ed as well
as by the words of the accused. See Lop,er v. U.S., supra.
A ·California case where there was a charge against
the def.endant of assault with intent to eommit rape, and
the evidence showed that the defendant had enticed a
twelve year old girl into a room and proceeded in addi-
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7
tional disguisting manner 'but decided not to actually
commit the crime of rape, and where the defendant
plead that the evidence failed to show that defendant
made the assault with the intent to eommit rape, ibut
that his intention was to gratify an unnatural desire,
which was not a crime, the court stated:

'' * * * As he did not hav-e sexual intercourse
with her, but did assult her, the question as to his
intent was to be determined by all the circumstances and by the acts of defendant. * * * The
intent of a person cannot be proven by direct
and positive evidence. It is a question of fact to
be proven, like any other fact, by acts, conduct,
and circumstances. It was the p:eculiar province
of the jury to find the intent. ''

People vs. Johnson, 131 Cal. 511, 63 P. 842.
It would he unreasonable to believe that the intent
of defendant could be determined if the circumstances
and acts ·of the defendant could not be us1ed in weighing
the intent of the accused. Intent is within the private
mind of the individual, except as expressed through his
words and acts and the circumstances of the particular
case.
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The evidence provides the only means of determining
intent, save .the actual truth when spoken by the accused.
In the cas•e at hand, the jury determined the intent of
the defendant to he consistent with the acts of the
defendant, which, the jury concluded, was an attempt to
steal the sheep. The conclusion of .the jury, under proper
instructions by the eourt, was soun·d and the evidence
is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty. Examples
of the sufficiency of the evidence are referred to below:
1. ·Commotion of ·sheep (R. 10, 22, 23).
2. Defendant was found to have entered the corral
·of another without permission (R. 11, 16, 24, 27, 37, 38,
42, 51, 52).
3. Th~e sheep was lying near defendant, and was
removed from the other sheep (R. 13, 15, 31).
4. Defendant had his hand around sheep's leg holding it ·down (R. 24, 27).
5. The sheep was at the •end of several feet of drag
marks (R. 14, 16, 20, 24).
6. Drag marks clearly visible (R. 14, 23, 39, 48, 50,
53, 54, 58).
7. The sheep had been dragged near gate in corral
(R. 33, 34).
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Fr-om

thes~e

circumstances and the balance :of the record,

sufficient evidence was introduced upon which the jury
could find the ·defendant guilty of attempt to commit
grand larceny. The appellant argues that the
fails to show

~that

evi~dence

defendant had any means of killing

or :asporting the sheep from the premises of the owner.
Appellant states that it is unreasonable to 1believe a man
would 1be so negligent as to fail to arrange a means of
asporting ,the object of h'is crime.
This court is not required to discharge the appellant
because there existed the pos'sihility that he might fail
to complete a greater crime ,than that of which he has
been found guil,ty. On the contrary, had he succeeded
in asporting the sheep, the jury would have found him

guilty of the greater crime of grand larceny. The court
will not knowingly serve the criminal and the court
will not relieve the appellant because he mi~scalculated
in his planning to commi,t grand larceny. It is not the
obligati~on uf the prosecution to prove .that the defendant
could have succe~eded in committing grand larceny had
he not been apprehended by the owner of the sheep.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY.
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The evidence was sufficient to
of the jury.

~support

the verdict

Appellant s~tates that ''·a proper analysis of all testimony will als-o f.ail to show any motive to injure or benefit. Therefore, there is no crime committeed if the mind
of the person is innocent." {Appellant's bri~ef p.18.)
The absence ·of intent to injure has no importance
in ·determining th~e intent to steal, as is clearly p~ointed
ou,t in Skeen v. Cra.ig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487, 490:
"The word 'intent' -as. use!d in Rev. Stat.
1898, See. 4068, providing that 'in every crime
or public offense there must exist a joint. operation of act and intent,' indicates an intent to -commit and act or to do something which the l~aw
denounces as a crime, regardless of the motives
the accused may have had for doing the wrong.
'The intent required is, not to break the law, but
to do the wrong.'
"If a man intends to do what he is conscious
the law, which every one is conclusively presumed
to know, foribids, there need he no other ·evil
intent."
The intent to benefit one's self is not a n·ecessary part
of intent, :as is said in State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P.
84, wh·erein the court s~tates:
''In ·order to constitute the crime of larceny,
it is not necessary to prove that the accused
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intended to derive s·ome benefit either to himself or for some other person from the theft.''
There

~seems

to be no conflict in the testimony of the

witnesses for the State. It will 1be noted that both Mr.
Hansen and Mr. Giraud, witnesses for the State, tHstified that Mr. Hansen was looking out of the corral and
into the field when Mr. Giraud found the defendant holding the sheep ( R. 11, 25). Mr. Giraud, however, did s·ee
defendant holding the sheep (R. 24) and the question of
fact raised iby denial of the defendant was a question for
the jury. There was nro testimony ·or evi'dence presented
to the court to indicate that the defendant was prejudiced

by hatred against him by police officers Williams and
Frandsen, except testimony of defendant. In State v.
Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P. 2d 843, 845, a ca:s·e involving the larceny of a heifer, the court, by Chief Justice
Larson, states :
'' *

* * The mere taking of personal property

by another does not, of eourse, constitute larceny.
The taking must be with felonious intent.
''As a general rule, the question of whether
the taking is felonious is a question for the jury.
See State v. DuBois.e, 64 Utah 433, 231 P. 625. An
exception is where there is no legal warrant for
the jury finding it to he felonious. State v. Mor~ell, 39 Utah 498, 118 P. 215; State v. Chynoweth,
41 Utah 354, 126 P. 302; State v. DuBois, supra.
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It is well settled by this c-ourt that when reasonable minds may differ and arrive at opposite conclusions, the finding of the jury ·must control.
State v. Gurr, 40 Utah 162, 120 P. 209, 39 L.R.A.
N.S. 320."
It is submitted that there was ·a ques.tion as to the
intent of defendant upon which reasonable men could
have ·differed. Un·der proper instruction'S by Judge Sevy,
the jury considered the testimony of all witnesses for
the State and for the defendant. Th·e jury performed
their duty in accordance with the law.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the eourt below .should be affirmed.
Resp~ectfully

submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER

.Attorney General
DONN E. CASSITY

Assistant .Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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